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However one feels about Justice Alito as a jurist, he is carving out a distinctive role for
himself on the Court at a pivotal time. That role and this time should be of interest to
people who care about the Court’s work regardless of their ideology. Particularly in light of
Justice Scalia’s passing, Justice Alito has become the primary judicial voice of the many
millions of Americans who appear to be losing the culture wars, including in battles over
gay rights, women’s access to reproductive healthcare, affirmative action, and religious
exemptions.
Part I observes that Justice Alito relies upon a variety of “modalities” of constitutional
interpretation; his conventional methodology distinguishes him only (albeit interestingly)
from Justices Scalia and Thomas. Looking elsewhere for what distinguishes Justice Alito
from the rest of his colleagues, Part II observes that his tenth year on the Court coincides
with a potentially significant moment in American constitutional history. Connecting the
moment to the man, Part III examines Justice Alito’s distinctive role, which is most
apparent in his majority opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.4and his dissent in
Obergefell v. Hodges.5 There and elsewhere, Justice Alito voices the concerns of
Americans who hold traditionalist conservative beliefs about speech, religion, guns, crime,
race, gender, sexuality, and the family. These Americans were previously majorities in the
real or imagined past, but they increasingly find themselves in the minority. Part IV
considers two alternative characterizations of Justice Alito—one from conservatives (who
may view Justice Alito as a Burkean conservative), and the other from liberals (who may
view him as a movement conservative). The Conclusion suggests that Justice Alito’s
distinctive role will likely be amplified in the years ahead, and identifies questions that
follow for his supporters and critics.
One point of emphasis before proceeding: people are complicated, and judges are people.
This Essay cannot capture the whole of Justice Alito, and so it does not try. Its more
modest objective is to identify what makes Justice Alito’s presence on the current Court
distinctive. In pursuing that inquiry, the Essay situates him squarely at the “hinge” point in
American constitutional history that may be imminent.
1 See, e.g., Stephanie Mencimer,
Conservatives Say They Want
Another Antonin Scalia. They Really
Wan…
2 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 1
(“There are louder talkers, flashier
stylists, wittier wits, mo…
PRINT ARCHIVE FORUM SUBMISSIONS MASTHEAD ABOUT CONTACT
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I. JUSTICE ALITO’S METHODOLOGY
Unlike Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice Alito is not to any significant extent an
originalist. Although he has described himself as a “practical originalist” on the ground that
he believes “the Constitution means something and that that meaning doesn’t change,”6 his
conduct on the Court suggests that the emphasis should be placed on the qualifier
“practical.” The higher the level of generality of the originalist inquiry, the less actual
difference there is between originalism and living constitutionalism. And Justice Alito is
fairly described as an originalist only at a high level of abstraction7—probably at the level
at which Jack Balkin casts the originalist inquiry.8 Unlike Justices Scalia and Thomas,
Justice Alito does not tend to justify his conservative decisionmaking as simply a product
of ideologically neutral methodological commitments, and he does not make occasional
admissions against apparent ideological interest in the name of fidelity to a relatively thick
understanding of originalism.
Like six of his seven current colleagues, Justice Alito is better described as a
methodological pluralist. As suggested by the cases discussed throughout this Essay, he
uses whatever modalities of interpretation—text, structure, precedent, original meaning,
tradition, consequences, and ethos—seem to him most appropriate in the case under
consideration.9 He implicitly agrees with Philip Bobbitt,10 as opposed to Richard Fallon,11
that there is no potentially constraining hierarchy among the legitimate modes of
constitutional argument.
Because Justice Alito’s pluralistic methodology is conventional, one must view him from a
different angle to discover his distinctive role on the Court. It will help to focus on the time
in constitutional history that may be fast arriving. The moment may reveal the man.
II. THE MOMENT
Over the past decade or so, cultural conservatives have, in significant ways, gone from
playing offense to playing defense. During the second Bush Administration, for example,
traditionalists pushed a federal constitutional amendment that would have prohibited same-
sex marriage. Now they concede the general issue and seek religious exemptions.
Writing in 2006, the year that Justice Alito joined the Court, Robert Post and Reva Siegel
identified tensions between the jurisprudence of originalism, which purports to transcend
contemporary cultural disagreements by invoking the authority of the original meaning of
the Constitution, and the political practice of originalism, which self-consciously
intervenes in contemporary cultural disputes in order to infuse the authoritative meaning of
the Constitution with conservative political values.12 Post and Siegel described the political
practice of originalism as being driven by a “politics of restoration, which encourages
citizens to protect traditional forms of life they fear are threatened—threatened by modern
mores and by a Court that has (mis)construed the Constitution to require social change.”13
Although the Roberts Court has become more conservative on most issues since Justice
Alito succeeded Justice O’Connor, the perception that traditional mores are under attack
has increased over the past decade, especially in the last few years. The Democratic Party
has controlled the White House for eight of those ten years, and the signature legislative
achievement of President Obama is a near-universal health care law that is viewed by many
conservatives as deeply threatening to individual liberty, including religious liberty. What
is more, same-sex marriage is now supported by more than 60% of the American public.14
The public has likely been persuaded in part by the Court, which was itself influenced by
3 See, e.g., Mencimer, supra note 1
(quoting Erwin Chemerinsky as
saying about Justice Alito that …
4 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
5 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
6 See Matthew Walther, Sam Alito: A
Civil Man, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR
(Apr. 21, 2014), http://specta…
7 See, e.g., id. (quoting Justice Alito as
saying “Some of [the Constitution’s]
provisions are b…
8 See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM
(2011). For an assessment that
emphasizes the thin-ness of …
9 See, e.g., Caetano v. Massachusetts,
136 S. Ct. 1027, 1028 (2016) (Alito,
J., concurring in judgme…
10 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1991).
11 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 10…
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dramatically changing public opinion as it moved—together with most other federal courts
—toward declaring that the right to marry includes same-sex marriage.15 And to add insult
to injury, Justice Scalia’s sudden death and Justice Kennedy’s arguable movement to the
left have meant, among other things, that affirmative action and abortion rights are
substantially more secure than they appeared to be a year ago.16
In light of these and other developments, it now appears possible to imagine that the
ideological left will win the culture wars.17 The culture remains deeply divided and the
future is by no means certain, but the idea that the left could prevail is thinkable now in a
way that it was not a few years ago. If that is correct, and if the Democratic Party wins the
presidency in 2016, a liberal majority may not only control the Court for the first time in
nearly half a century, but also develop staying power. Under that scenario—fear of which
may help explain the historically extraordinary refusal of Senate Republicans to consider
President Obama’s nomination of Chief Judge Merrick Garland to replace Justice
Scalia18—we will have reached a “hinge” point in American constitutional history.
Of course, the millions of Americans with traditional beliefs about a range of subjects have
not gone away over the past decade, nor will they disappear if the Democratic Party
dominates the presidency and the judiciary in the years ahead. But the idea that
traditionalists will be able to “restor[e] the culture”19 may become increasingly implausible
even to them. Their politics of restoration of the culture will have evolved into a politics of
dissent from the culture. As Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel recently observed in the
context of religious accommodations, they will “shift from speaking as a majority seeking
to enforce traditional morality to speaking as a minority seeking exemptions from laws that
offend traditional morality.”20
III. JUSTICE ALITO’S DISTINCTIVE ROLE
At this critical juncture, Justice Alito tries to protect tradition-oriented minorities who used
to be majorities in the real or imagined past.21 In his majority opinion in Hobby Lobby,
Justice Alito observes that some religious owners of closely held, for-profit corporations
cannot in good conscience provide their employees with insurance coverage for certain
kinds of medical procedures. Then, with the Casey Court’s concern for women potentially
in mind,22 he declares that the federal government “would effectively exclude these people
from full participation in the economic life of the Nation.”23 He reads the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act24 so as to prohibit the government from exercising such
authority.
Justice Alito sounds similar themes in his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges. In the initial
parts of that dissent, he makes conventional pleas for judicial humility and restraint that, I
argue below, he does not himself follow in many other areas of law. More revealing is the
final part of his dissent, where he emphasizes “other important consequences” of the
Court’s conclusion that the right to marry includes same-sex marriage.25 His foremost
concern is that the decision “will be used to vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent
to the new orthodoxy.”26 Although “those who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper
their thoughts in the recesses of their homes,” he fears that “if they repeat those views in
public, they will risk being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments,
employers, and schools.”27 “By imposing its own views on the entire country,” Justice
Alito decries, “the majority facilitates the marginalization of the many Americans who
have traditional ideas.”28 The consequentialist concern that traditionalists will be branded
as bigots is sufficiently serious for Justice Alito that it counts as a reason for the Court to
reject the constitutional claim.29
12 See Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Originalism as a Political Practice:
The Right’s Living Constitut…
13 Id. at 572.
14 In a Gallup poll conducted May 4-8,
2016, 37% of respondents expressed
the view that same-sex marr…
15 See generally Neil S. Siegel,
Reciprocal Legitimation in the
Federal Courts System: Racial
Segrega…
16 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerste…
17 Cf. Mark Tushnet, Abandoning
Defensive Crouch Liberal
Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION (May
6, 201…
18 See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, The Harm
in the GOP’s Pseudo-Principled
Supreme Court Stance, THE HILL:…
19 See LIBERTY COUNSEL,
http://www.lc.org/
[http://perma.cc/J8V7-TATK]
(“Liberty Counsel is Restori…
20 Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel,
Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based
Conscience Claims in Religion …
21 Cf. Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at
561 (explaining that a politics of
restoration “aims to res…
22 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992)
(“The ability of women to p…
23 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014).
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(2012).
25 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2642 (2015) (Alito,
J., dissenting).
26 Id.
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Justice Alito recently sought again to protect majorities-turned-minorities. He dissented
from the denial of certiorari in Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman,30 a case involving a First
Amendment challenge to Washington state regulations. In his view, those regulations “are
likely to make a pharmacist unemployable if he or she objects on religious grounds to
dispensing certain prescription medications.”31 Justice Alito objected that “this Court does
not deem the case worthy of our time,” even though “there is much evidence that the
impetus for the adoption of the regulations was hostility to pharmacists whose religious
beliefs regarding abortion and contraception are out of step with prevailing opinion in the
State.”32 Then, perhaps looking ahead to the 2016 elections, he wrote that “[i]f this is a sign
of how religious liberty claims will be treated in the years ahead, those who value religious
freedom have cause for great concern.”33
Present in the foregoing passages is a revelation of Justice Alito’s distinctive role on the
Court. More than any other Justice, he uses his judicial voice to express the values of those
with “traditional views” who were once real or imagined majorities and are now
increasingly minorities with respect to a variety of “culture war” issues. Majorities-turned-
minorities, not “discrete and insular minorities,”34 seem to be the objects of Justice Alito’s
concern. He empathizes with their plight as the world changes profoundly around them.
And he seeks to preserve their ability to dissent, to resist, to refuse to accept the new
normal. Whether through the judicial assertiveness of his majority opinion in Hobby
Lobby35 or the judicial restraint of his Obergefell dissent, Justice Alito protects what used
to be a politics of restoration, and what is increasingly becoming a politics of dissent.36
Viewing Justice Alito, in important part, as a traditionalist protecting majorities-turned-
minorities in a period of cultural transition can account for his responses to a number of
controversial cases. The most obvious are his votes in cases involving the Establishment
Clause,37 religious accommodations,38 abortion,39 and same-sex marriage.40 Less obvious
may be some of his federalism commitments,41 which may reflect the reality that
traditionalism is today more likely to prevail locally than nationally. Moreover, his votes in
cases involving the Second Amendment,42 criminal procedure,43 capital punishment,44 and
race45 may reflect, at least in part, a conception of gun owners,46 crime victims, and white
Americans as minorities who are disadvantaged by a liberal culture that rejects real or
imagined traditional conservative values of self-defense, defense of others, law and order,
and colorblindness.47
Justice Alito is also the least free-speech libertarian on the Roberts Court. His lone dissents
in United States v. Stevens48 and Snyder v. Phelps49 give voice to the common sense and
outrage of the community over expressive conduct that has traditionally been regarded as
despicable. Moreover, his narrow concurrence in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n
strikes similar themes.50 In those cases, Justice Alito responds as would a traditionalist
conservative like Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who never really accepted the modern
conservative movement’s embrace (by the early 1990s) of free-speech libertarianism or
libertarianism more generally.
Given Justice Alito’s role as dissenter from the Court’s free-speech libertarianism, his
votes in campaign finance cases51 seem difficult to explain in other than partisan terms.
Perhaps, however, those votes may be understood, at least in part, as empowering
traditionalists with resources to dissent from “the new orthodoxy” by spending as much as
they want to influence the outcomes of as many election campaigns as they want.52 A
problem with this suggestion, however, is that traditionalist conservatives do not appear to
have disproportionately benefited from, or taken advantage of, Citizens United and its
progeny.
27 Id. at 2642-43.
28 Id. at 2643.
29 One wonders if there is an
autobiographical element to Justice
Alito’s concern. He has described…
30 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016).
31 Id. at 2433 (Alito, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see
also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCR…
35 True, Hobby Lobby was a statutory
interpretation case, not a free
exercise case. But it was infuse…
36 Cf. Paulsen, supra note 1 (“Those of
us whose views are not in accord
with the current trend of …
37 See, e.g., Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828
(2014) (Alito, J., concurring).
38 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
39 See Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016);
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 1…
40 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015); United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)…
41 See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder,
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
42 See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136
S. Ct. 1027, 1028 (2016) (Alito, J.,
concurring); McDonald v. Ci…
43 Of all the Justices, Justice Alito is
the most hostile to claims brought by
criminal defendants un…
44 See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.
Ct. 2726 (2015); Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
45 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Ricci
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However many of Justice Alito’s responses to controversial cases are captured by the
account offered here, viewing him in part as the primary judicial voice of traditionalist
conservatives identifies what is most distinctive about his role on the Roberts Court. When
his conservative colleagues agree with him in culture war disputes, as is typically the case,
more often than not they allow him to speak for them, even though he is the most junior
among them.53 When they do not allow him to lead, he often feels moved to speak for
himself.54 And when they are libertarians, as opposed to traditionalists, in certain speech
cases, he dissents.55
An interesting question is whether it is just the values that majorities-turned-minorities
possess, not their minority status per se, that moves Justice Alito, or whether he is also
invested in them because they have lost political and cultural power (an endowment effect
of sorts). Alternatively, perhaps he regards majorities-turned-minorities as the sort of
Footnote 4 minorities that warrant special judicial solicitude; his emotional Ricci
concurrence has something of that feel to it.56 Regardless, the idea of “majorities-turned-
minorities” is useful because it captures how American culture is changing—and how
Justice Alito understands the culture to be changing. The idea also underscores that Justice
Alito has rhetorically seized the mantle of protector of minorities—a potential example of
what Jack Balkin has called “ideological drift.”57
IV. TWO ALTERNATIVE CHARACTERIZATIONS
A conservative skeptic of the foregoing account might suggest that Justice Alito responds
less as a traditionalist, and more as a Burkean, in some of the cases discussed above.58 For
example, his opinions in Obergefell and McDonald v. City of Chicago59 do express
Burkean themes by emphasizing the virtues of continuity and slow change in American
society. Consistent with a Burkean presumption in favor of sticking with established
institutions and practices that have historically worked at least tolerably well, he writes in
both cases that the critical question in a substantive due process analysis is whether an
asserted right is objectively, deeply rooted in American history and tradition. As he notes,
same-sex marriage is not.60
The majority opinion in Obergefell is, however, Burkean in its own way.61 And Justice
Alito dissented from the arguably Burkean majority opinions in NLRB v. Noel Canning62
and Zivotofsky v. Kerry,63 which emphasize in part the longstanding historical practice of
the political branches.64 More fundamentally, a Burkean conservative would care too much
about stability to want the Court’s doctrine to change substantially over the course of a
decade, which, to reiterate, is what happened when and, for the most part, because Justice
Alito replaced Justice O’Connor and voted to move the law.65 In short, a Burkean
conservative would be loath to uproot longstanding precedents, including liberal ones.66
Justice Alito seems more of a traditionalist conservative than a Burkean.
A liberal skeptic might argue that Justice Alito responds less as a traditionalist
conservative, and more as a movement conservative.67 His opinions and votes in divisive
cases do often reflect the ideological agenda for the courts of the Reagan Justice
Department, of which he was a part as a young, aspiring lawyer. That agenda included,
among other objectives, significant constitutional limits on the scope of federal power, a
substantially greater role for religion in public life, a robust understanding of individual
Second Amendment rights, a rollback of procedural protections for criminal defendants, a
defense of the permissibility of capital punishment, a commitment to a colorblind, anti-
classification principle in racial equality cases, and, above all else, the overruling of Roe v.
v. DeStefano, 557 U.S.…
46 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Identity
Politics and the Second Amendment,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 549 (20…
47 See, e.g., Ricci, 557 U.S. at 607
(2009) (Alito, J., concurring)
(“Petitioners are firefighters …
48 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
49 562 U.S. 443, 463 (2011) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
50 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
51 See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134
S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Citizens United
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
52 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 1
(describing McCutcheon as
“concern[ing] the freedom of
citizens…
53 See, for example, the foregoing
discussions of Stormans, Inc. v.
Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016), …
54 See, for example, the foregoing
discussions of Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), Unite…
55 See the foregoing discussions of
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443
(2011), and United States v. Steve…
56 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 596 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
57 See Jack M. Balkin, Ideological Drift
and the Struggle over Meaning, 25
CONN. L. REV. 869, 870 (19…
58 See, e.g., Adam J. White, The
Burkean Justice, THE WEEKLY STANDARD
(July 18, 2011), http://www.wee…
59 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
60 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584, 2640 (2015) (Alito, J.,
dissenting). Of course, as note…
61 See 2016 SUPPLEMENT to PAUL BREST ET
AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MA…
62 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
63 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
64 For analysis of the role of historical
practice in Noel Canning, see Curtis
A. Bradley & Neil S. S…
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Wade and a celebration of traditional family values.68 For the most part, appointments by
President Reagan and both Presidents Bush, including the appointment of Justice Alito,
moved the Court in the direction of realizing that agenda.
Although characterizing Justice Alito as a movement conservative can help explain many
of his votes, such a characterization does not get at the reasons for his affiliation with
movement conservatism. Nor does it account for his solo dissents or separate opinions in
certain speech cases, in which he deviates from movement conservatism. It also overlooks
the fact that movement conservatives in the late 1980s and early 1990s, unlike Justice Alito
today, were relatively opposed to religious exemptions.69 In any event, this Essay seeks to
identify what distinguishes Justice Alito from the rest of his colleagues, not what makes
him like other Republican appointees. Relatedly, the Essay seeks to connect him to the
current historical moment, not to the one that occurred when President Reagan was elected
in 1980.
CONCLUSION
If a liberal majority with staying power soon emerges on the Court, Justice Alito’s dissents
on behalf of traditionalist dissenters may become more frequent and more strident in the
years ahead. As suggested by his recent dissent from the denial of certiorari in Stormans,70
Justice Alito appears to have already anticipated playing such a role. And as noted at the
outset, no other Justice seems better situated to assume it in the wake of Justice Scalia’s
passing. The role also seems to suit Justice Alito temperamentally. In an interview with the
American Spectator in April 2014, he explained that he prefers writing for himself and not
the Court.71 He also confessed that he takes “a certain pleasure” in rooting for a perpetually
losing baseball team (the Philadelphia Phillies).72 And he expressed his admiration for
“stubbornness, stubbornness to stick with something,” even if “it’s not fun being on the
losing side.”73
If there is truth to this Essay’s suggestion that Justice Alito is, and may increasingly
become, the leading dissenter on behalf of dissenters from an increasingly liberal culture
and Court, a question for him and his admirers is how to defend such substantive
commitments, and not also those that would protect certain other historic and
contemporary minorities. A question for liberals is how to respond to the apparently
declining influence of the commitments that Justice Alito strives to protect. Many liberals
will no doubt view those commitments as all the more reason to make a clean break from
an oppressive past, much the way Radical Republicans in Congress took a hard line in the
aftermath of the Civil War. Such liberals empathize with the people who were—and are—
treated very badly when certain “traditional ideas” prevail.
Other liberals, however, may defend more accommodating approaches, much the way
President Lincoln sought to proceed. They too empathize with those who suffered—and,
depending on where they live, still suffer—under traditionalist conservatism. But they also
empathize with those traditionalist Americans who feel increasingly alienated from cultural
changes they find difficult to comprehend and cannot control.
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65 See, for example, Justice Alito’s
votes in the campaign finance,
Establishment Clause, Second Am…
66 See generally Thomas W. Merrill,
Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 509, 509-11 (1996) (ar…
67 See, e.g., Mencimer, supra note 1
(“[T]hroughout his career, Alito has
stayed true to his roots …
68 See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
YEAR 2000: CHO…
69 See, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the
Free Exercise Clause permi…
70 Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S.
Ct. 2433 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting
from the denial of certio…
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